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BESPOKE CUSTOM
EDWARD T. SWAINE*
INTRODUCTION
Curtis Bradley and Mitu Gulati’s stimulating article describes a
version of customary international law (“CIL”) they claim has been left on
the shelf—and which they suggest might be dusted off and employed
again.1 CIL, they argue, was once thought to be subject (sometimes) to a
right of unilateral withdrawal. They are at pains to avoid directly
advocating a return to that approach, but they do suggest that it deserves
serious consideration. Adopting a constrained right of unilateral withdrawal
comes across as less of a revolution than a restoration, a return to those
halcyon days before CIL was modernized (or, perhaps, radicalized).
Bradley and Gulati deserve great credit for helping to revitalize the
debate about CIL, and they correctly perceive that modern discussion
neglects the possibility of unilateral withdrawal—and that a reevaluation is
in order. This brief Essay simply hopes to extend that dialogue, rather than
offering categorical support or opposition to the so-called Default View. It
does suggest, though, that Bradley and Gulati’s account of customized
custom is itself bespoke. Because their understanding of the intellectual
history of CIL, and that history’s continuing significance, is contestable,
they tend to understate the novelty of their thought-experiment. This bears,
in turn, on their normative assessment of its appeal.
I. THE “DEFAULT VIEW” OF CIL
The “Default View” of CIL, according to Bradley and Gulati, is “that
CIL rules were at least sometimes subject to unilateral withdrawal.”2 The
qualifier contemplates two kinds of exceptions. First, it would permit only
prospective withdrawal and, perhaps, require reasonable notice in order to
protect reliance interests.3 Second, a narrow class of rules—discussed

* Professor of Law, George Washington University Law School.
1. See Curtis A. Bradley & Mitu Gulati, Withdrawing from International Custom, 120 YALE L.J.
202 (2010). This Essay was originally prepared in reaction to a prior version of their article.
2. Id. at 206 (emphasis added).
3. Id. at 258-59; see also id. at 215.
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below—might also be exempted.4 But the idea, in all events, is that the
Default View is also a default view about the appropriate principle: under
the Default View, absent unusual circumstances, unilateral withdrawal
should be permissible; because of its historical foundations, moreover, we
should (they imply) be content with the Default View itself, unless we can
explain why it was discarded.
Whose view was this, exactly? It seems to be traced to the
international law publicists of the eighteenth century, including Vattel—a
very good place to start. But if that was all there was to it, the mystery of
what happened to the Default View would really be no mystery at all.
Vattel was widely cited and highly influential,5 but so far as can be
determined, his influence had little to do with his abstract principles—
rather, his treatise was prized because he pronounced on a number of issues
confronted by states, and did so in a way that was sympathetic to their
problems and vague enough to be cited by everyone.6
Vattel’s understanding of CIL, like that of his contemporaries, is so
different from ours that the loss of the Default View would be incidental. In
part, this difference is due to broader jurisprudential changes that Bradley
and Gulati identify—”the shift to the Mandatory View,” as they describe it,
notwithstanding at least a feint toward voluntarism.7 But jurisprudential
changes are not the only reason that Vattel and his ilk have lost their

4. Id. at 217-18.
5. See Charles G. Fenwick, The Authority of Vattel, 7 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 395, 406-10 (1913)
(citing authorities discussing Vattel); see also Bradely & Gulati, supra note 1, at 219 n.68.
6. Critics of Vattel, though less numerous or vocal than his adherents, are consistent in these
criticisms. Charles Fenwick, for example, alludes to Vattel’s influence, but only after an extended
criticism of his classification of international law. See, e.g., id., at 403 (observing, following summary
of Vattel’s crucial distinctions between perfect and imperfect rights and external and internal rules, that
“[i]t is evident that the above distinctions lead us nowhere”); id. at 405 (noting that “a system of
international law into which the law of nature enters as the chief constituent element cannot stand the
test of critical analysis”); see also Martti Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of
International Legal Argument 89 (1989) (describing Vattel’s as “a ‘realistic’ book, especially useful for
diplomats and practitioners, not the least because it seemed to offer such compelling rhetoric for the
justification of most varied kinds of State action”); James Kent, KENT’S COMMENTARY ON
INTERNATIONAL LAW 42 (J.T. Abdy ed., 2d ed. 1878) (praising utility of Vattel as “the statesman’s
manual and oracle,” but adding that “he is deficient in philosophical precision; the classification of his
work is faulty . . . nor does he sufficiently support the general doctrines of International Law by
historical proofs and precedents”); Arthur Nussbaum, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE LAW OF NATIONS
159-60 (rev. ed. 1954) (criticizing Vattel for his lack of legal training and for “the striking ambiguity of
his formulas and for the inconsistency of many of his conclusions,” and claiming that “[a]mong the
legal learned Vattel has never met with much praise”); id. at 161 (noting the “paradoxical” appeal of
Vattel, and explaining that “[t]he ambiguity of Vattel’s propositions—indeed, the ambiguity of an
oracle—made it only the easier to refer to his treatise in diplomatic correspondence,” and “the
philosophical paraphernalia could be ignored without diminishing the usefulness of the book”).
7. Bradley & Gulati, supra note 1, at 226, 227-28.
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purchase, and Bradley and Gulati may not sufficiently credit differences
that were immanent in the originals. Vattel posited a complicated
classification of international law: there was “the necessary law of nations”
(in effect, a natural law for nations)8 and three species of “the positive law
of nations”—the “voluntary” (predicated on presumed consent),
“conventional” (predicated on express consent, and synonymous with the
law of treaties), and the “customary” (predicated on tacit consent).9 This
classification was not analytically satisfying, but what is important is how
Vattel accounts for what we now call CIL. As Bradley and Gulati observe,
Vattel noted several times something that sounds like a right to withdraw.
Thus, he was willing to presume consent for customary law, and to assume
that it binds all states, but on the condition that the states “have not
expressly declared their resolution of not observing it in the future.”10
It is unclear, however, what class of customary conduct—putting
aside, that is, treaty obligations—he had in mind. On the one hand, Vattel
seemed to have a broader vision of the kinds of things that might be
deemed customary: he did not, notably, impose anything like the modern
requirement of opinio juris, so it was open for him to deem a practice
customary if it was a matter of routine. Withdrawing from such practices
could be entirely consistent, consequently, with what Bradley and Gulati
address as the Mandatory View, since such customs would probably not
qualify as modern CIL in the first place.
On the other hand, Vattel also regarded some obligations that the
Mandatory View would treat as CIL as not subject to a right of withdrawal.
If a state operated under what he termed an “external” (meaning, not a
question confined to its own judgment and conscience) and “perfect”
obligation (meaning, the kind of right that by its nature gave other states
rights to demand observance, as opposed to an “imperfect” right, which
only vests an opposing state the right to ask that it be observed)—which
together seems to constitute the class that Vattel called the “voluntary” law
of nations—then states were not free to opt out.11 Bradley and Gulati

8. EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS OR THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL LAW
APPLIED TO THE CONDUCT AND TO THE AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND OF SOVEREIGNS, § 7 (Joseph Chitty
ed., 1883) (1758).
9. Id. at § 27.
10. Id. at § 26.
11. Id. at § 17 (making distinctions between perfect and imperfect rights); id. § 20 (explaining that
“[a] nation then is mistress of her own actions so long as they do not affect the proper and perfect rights
of any other nation—so long as she is only internally bound, and does not lie under any external and
perfect obligation.”) (emphasis in original); id. §§ 21-23 (describing voluntary law of nations and its
enforcement).
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acknowledge this forthrightly,12 but understate its significance. Vattel
might have deemed much of what we would now term CIL to be part of
this “voluntary” law of nations. The remaining “internal” or “imperfect”
rules, from which states could withdraw, might also be thought of as
customary by modern lights—and perhaps labeled as traditional, soft law,
emerging principles, or general principles—without being deemed the kind
of legal obligations that brook no withdrawal. Of course, the set of rules
that bind even a dissent-minded state under Vattel’s approach and the set of
rules that bind that state under the Mandatory View might differ
considerably, but that discrepancy can be explained by historical
developments (such as the shift toward human rights as the subject of CIL)
without turning on any shift from a Default View.13
Bradley and Gulati do not cite Vattel only, and it may seem unfair to
focus only on his work.14 But Vattel was, as they stress, influential, and he
influenced the work of others; these other writings, too, leave the
demarcation of withdrawal-friendly rules quite unclear.15 Yet other
publicists may have been clearer in permitting unilateral withdrawal from
the kinds of rules that today would be subject to the Mandatory View, and
Bradley and Gulati scarcely bear the burden of demonstrating a universal
conviction in favor of the Default View. At some point, though—just as
with state practice—it is fair to conclude that views were simply too
diverse and unclear to establish much of anything, let alone a well-defined,
broadly accepted approach the demise of which requires explaining.

12. Bradley & Gulati, supra note 1, at 217-18.
13. For a discussion of this development, see generally Anthea Elizabeth Roberts, Traditional and
Modern Approaches to Customary International Law: A Reconciliation, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 757 (2001).
14. See Bradley & Gulati, supra note 1, at 217 n.57 (citing other examples).
15. Burlamaqui, to whom they refer, indeed described the law of nations as “arbitrary and free,”
and “being obligatory only in regard to those who have voluntarily submitted thereto, and only so long
as they may please, because they are always at liberty to change or repeal it”—but distinguished that
from “an universal, necessary, and self-obligatory law of nations, which differs in nothing from the law
of nature, and is consequently immutable, inasmuch that the people or sovereigns cannot dispense with
it, even by consent, without transgressing their duty.” J.J. BURLAMAQUI, THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL
LAW, IN WHICH THE TRUE SYSTEMS OF MORALITY AND CIVIL GOVERNMENT ARE ESTABLISHED 199
(Nugent transl. 1748) (1718). Martens said expressly that rights founded on “simple custom” would
cease whenever a state made a timely declaration, either express or tacit, of its intention to do so”—but
imagined a distinction between such rights and inherent rights, rights acquired by possession, rights
acquired by treaty, and rights acquired by “tacit convention” while suggesting that some of the latter
rights (of particular relevance, those inherent or the product of tacit convention) could not be
unilaterally terminated. GEORG F. MARTENS, A COMPENDIUM OF THE LAW OF NATIONS, FOUNDED ON
THE TREATIES AND CUSTOMS OF THE MODERN NATIONS OF EUROPE 356 (William Cobbett transl.
1802) (1788). Finally, they cite Bynkershoek, discussed infra note 35. CORNELIUS VAN BYNKERSHOEK,
DE FORO LEGATORUM: A MONOGRAPH ON THE JURISDICTION OVER AMBASSADORS IN BOTH CIVIL AND
CRIMINAL CASES, 106-07 (Gordon J. Laing trans., Clarendon Press 1946) (1744).
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Interestingly, though modern international law is sometimes
lambasted as an academic concoction,16 the Default View is tethered almost
exclusively to the opinions of leading publicists. This is understandable,
given that states during its supposed tenure may have failed to assess their
own behavior in legal terms, and almost certainly did a worse job at
pronouncing their understanding of the fundamental concepts of
international law. But it means that states may never have acted in
contemplation of the Default View; they may never have supposed, for
instance, that they could postpone their disagreement with emerging CIL
until some later point, when they could notice their withdrawal from the
norm. This leaves considerably more legal and political space for the
Mandatory View.
II. THE “MANDATORY” VIEW
Bradley and Gulati contrast the Default View with a now-canonical
Mandatory View (we should bracket whether this is genuinely canonical, or
unitary, and whether it has really managed to sweep views like Vattel’s
under the rug).17 At points they describe this Mandatory View as “[t]he
complete disallowance of unilateral withdrawal from CIL,”18 but the
disallowance seems incomplete if, as they also say, states may be able to
persistently object and thereby unilaterally withdraw from (what eventually
becomes) CIL.19 What they seem to mean, more precisely, is that the
Mandatory View holds that states cannot object subsequently to a fullyformed CIL rule and thereby exempt themselves from its application.20

16. For a clear articulation of this concern, focusing on its consequences for U.S. human rights
litigation, see Curtis A. Bradley, The Costs of International Human Rights Litigation, 2 CHI. J. INT’L L.
457, 468 (2001) (“In effect, these academic experts, like the judges, are engaged in a form of law
creation.”).
17. Consensualists would be startled by either suggestion, as would anyone who notes their debt
to Vattel—albeit without necessarily having sketched the implications for withdrawal. See, e.g.,
Jonathan I. Charney, The Persistent Objector Rule and the Development of Customary International
Law, 56 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 1, 1 (1986) (stating that “[t]he positivists clearly held that no rule of
international law could be binding on a State without its consent,” and citing Vattel). Bradley and
Gulati quote Charney’s contention that “[n]o authority would permit a State unilaterally to opt out of an
existing rule of customary international law,” Bradley & Gulati, supra note 1, at 226 (citing id. at 2),
but that gets to a narrower point—and is based on Charney’s more controversial opinion that
consensualists invariably find consent. Charney, supra, at 2.
18. Bradley & Gulati, supra note 1, at 211 (“The complete disallowance of unilateral withdrawal
from CIL is what we call the Mandatory View.”).
19. Id. at 233.
20. Id. at 205 (citing INT’L LAW ASS’N, COMM. ON THE FORMATION OF CUSTOMARY (GEN.) INT’L
LAW, STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES APPLICABLE TO THE FORMATION OF GENERAL CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW, 27 (2000)).
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Putting these quarrels aside, what is the Mandatory View, and how
closely does it resemble a genuinely “mandatory,” non-derogable,
conception of CIL? It is worth pausing, first, over what Bradley and Gulati
identify and discuss as “the one exception to the Mandatory View’s
disallowance of unilateral opt out”: the persistent objector doctrine,
according to which a state may exempt itself from CIL’s binding effect by
persistently objecting to a rule before it becomes fully established.21 As
Bradley and Gulati say, this may not be much of an exception. It seems to
have originated sometime after World War II, in a contemporaneous pair of
International Court of Justice opinions properly described as ambiguous.22
Subsequent state practice, as they note, suggests little overt employment.23
It is entirely possible, though, that states wield the possibility of persistent
objection as a bargaining chip for moderating objectionable claims to CIL,
in which case its influence would be mostly behind the scenes.
If anything, Bradley and Gulati may be the ones making too much of
it. They reject suggestions that the persistent objector doctrine was a
genuine concession to a consent-oriented vision of CIL.24 Rather, they
suggest, the point was to facilitate the growth of CIL by defusing concerns
that new rules would require acquiescence by an ever-growing cast of
states—simultaneously, it is implied, smoothing the path for accepting the
Mandatory View.25 This explanation relies too heavily on their dichotomy

21. Id. at 233.
22. Asylum Case (Colom. v. Peru), 1950 I.C.J. 266, 277-78 (Nov. 20); Fisheries Case (U.K. v.
Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. 116, 131 (Dec. 18).
23. Bradley & Gulati, supra note 1, at 33 (citing Ted L. Stein, The Approach of the Different
Drummer: The Principle of the Persistent Objector in International Law, 26 HARV. INT’L L.J. 457, 459
(1985)). But see, e.g., Letter from John Bellinger III, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of State, and William J.
Haynes, General Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Defense, to Jakob Kellenberger, President, International
Committee of the Red Cross, Regarding Customary International Law Study (Nov. 3, 2006), 46 ILM
514 (2007), available at http://www.defense.gov/home/pdf/Customary_International_ Humanitiarian_
Law.pdf (stating that “the U.S. government thinks that the [persistent objector] doctrine remains valid,”
albeit without relying on that doctrine).
24. Bradley & Gulati, supra note 1, at 240 (“[T]he rise of the persistent objector doctrine did not
represent a shift back towards a greater consent requirement in international law. . . .”). It is not clear
whether this simply expresses their view that the consent requirement never truly went away, or a
separate point about the consistency of the persistent objector doctrine with consensualism. In either
event, it is in tension with their observation that the Fisheries Case “could just as easily be read to
support the Default View of CIL; there is nothing in [the Court’s] language that suggests that Norway’s
opposition must have occurred prior to the establishment of the alleged rule of CIL.” Id. at 235. Of
course, nothing in the case suggests the Court’s logic should be so extended, given its holding (which
they acknowledge) that the alleged rule did not exist.
25. Id. at 238-40. This assumes something about the motives of a diverse set of advocates—and
their capacity to anticipate the doctrine’s near-irrelevance in practice—that is quite difficult to establish.
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between a Default View and a Mandatory View.26 The more neutral
explanation is that the persistent objector doctrine—prompted by the
postwar growth in customary international law claims, new participants in
international lawmaking, and so forth—was simply one more response to a
persistent puzzle for international lawyers, who have never resolved
whether states individual states enjoy a heckler’s veto against new CIL.
Indeed, the persistent objector debate addressed a problem that afflicts
the Default View as well. Vattel and others regarded the tacit consent of
states as the predicate for some customary law,27 and a state that has
persistently objected can certainly maintain that its consent is no longer a
tenable fiction. To be sure, if the Default View already accorded states the
capacity to exit unilaterally at any time, the point of persistent objection
would be ameliorated, but scarcely eliminated. States that had objected
would by definition be unencumbered by any concerns about advance
notification or reliance by other states (since no law had yet emerged).28
Moreover, nothing in the Default View preserved a right to withdraw from
the voluntary law of nations—as persistent objection might.29
So persistent objection may not be a jury-rigged exception distinctive
to the Mandatory View; what is more, it is not the only real exception to
that view at all, as is evident from the literature on persistent objection.
Regional, particular, or special CIL—which is arguably on display in some
of the same cases thought to substantiate the doctrine of persistent
objection—may be the more important loophole. The premise is that states
may forge for themselves a tailor-made form of custom the formulation of
which depends heavily on consent; consistent with that predicate, it has
been argued that actual consent is also critical in order for it to be opposed
to a particular state.30

26. But cf. id. at 240 (suggesting that the debate has instead been stilted by framing it as a choice
between the Mandatory View with the persistent objector doctrine and the Mandatory View without it).
27. Charney, supra note 17, at 18 (“Only if one actually believes in the reality of the tacit consent
theory of international legal obligation might there be any room for the persistent objector rule.”).
Professor Charney added that “[i]n that case, it is difficult to limit [the doctrine’s] application only to
overt dissent commenced at the formative stages of rule development.” See id. Perhaps the supposition
was that reliance interests settled in after the rule had flowered, though Bradley and Gulati persuasively
argue that reliance interests can be exaggerated. See Bradley & Gulati, supra note 1, at 254-58.
28. It is a nice point, in any event, whether early proponents of the Default View anticipated the
kind of evolutionary capacity in customary international law that the persistent objector doctrine
assumes.
29. Cf. Charney, supra note 17, at 19 n.81 (arguing that the persistent objector rule, if good law,
should also apply to jus cogens norms).
30. See generally ANTHONY A. D’AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
Ch. 8 (1971) (discussing, inter alia, the Asylum Case and the Fisheries Case). For criticisms of
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Even putting aside the persistent objector principle and special CIL, in
what sense is modern CIL “mandatory”? Consider, for a moment, a world
in which at first there were only purely volitional legal obligations; then
suddenly appeared a full-fledged multilateral convention, inconsistent with
the behavior and preferences of at least some states, which imposed
detailed and substantial constraints on state behavior. The final articles of
this hypothetical convention do not spend much time explaining how states
become parties and when the convention comes into force, but rather
provide that the convention is binding simply by virtue of its hidden
negotiation, permits no reservations or withdrawals, and (here’s the kicker)
constrains all states.
Is this akin to CIL, as transformed by the Mandatory View? Not
really. First, there may have been a point when assessing CIL was like legal
archaeology, but increasingly it is generated by international collegial
activities that are reasonably conspicuous, subject to contestation, and
vulnerable to some of the same choke points as any new multilateral
convention.31 It is quite hard, in the ordinary case, to claim that a customary

D’Amato’s legal premises, see Michael Akehurst, Custom as a Source of International Law, 47 BRIT.
Y.B. INT’L L. 1, 24-25 (1974-75).
To be sure, Bradley and Gulati appear to be focusing on general CIL, and so should not have to account
for the function of consent for other bodies of law, but at least one of the cases they cite in support of a
doctrine of unilateral withdrawal arguably sounds in regional custom. In Ware v. Hylton, as they report,
Justice Chase’s opinion stated that the customary law of nations was binding only on those states that
adopted it (by providing their tacit consent), which meant that Virginia was free to reject a customary
norm to refrain from confiscating private debts. Bradley & Gulati, supra note 1, at 219-20 (discussing
Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 227-28 (1796)).
Their understanding that Justice Chase, at least, supported something like a right to unilateral
withdrawal is eminently reasonable. But Justice Chase also reported his understanding, based on Vattel,
that the general norm favored the right to confiscate any enemy property during wartime, and that a
different custom with regards to private debts had taken hold in Europe. His opinion may thus be read
to marginalize something we might now call a regional custom—albeit one of exceptional significance
to the development of custom at that time. See Ware, 3 U.S. at 227 (“The relaxation or departure from
the strict rights of war to confiscate private debts, by the commercial nations of Europe, was not binding
on the state of Virginia, because founded on custom only; and she was at liberty to reject, or adopt the
custom, as she pleased.”); see also id. at 229 (“Great Britain does not consider herself bound to depart
from the rigor of the general law of nations, because the commercial powers of Europe wish to adopt a
more liberal practice.”); see also id. at 254 (“I shall not, however, controvert the position, that, by the
rigour of the law of nations, debts of the description just mentioned, may be confiscated. This rule has
by some been considered as a relict of barbarism; it is certainly a hard one, and cannot continue long
among commercial nations; indeed, it ought not to have existed among any nations, and, perhaps, is
generally exploded at the present day in Europe. Hear the language of Vattell [sic] on this subject . . .”).
It is also interesting that Vattel’s own language concerning the capacity to withdraw was not invoked as
a foil against his opinion that Virginia’s behavior breached customary law, which the Court was
evidently resisting—particularly given that he was quoted throughout the opinion.
31. The absence of any formal domestic approval process, which sometimes dooms treaties, is one
important difference, but CIL may suffer from comparable limitations when it is actually invoked.
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norm has sprung full-grown from the brow of Zeus, and easy to imagine
circumstances in which CIL initiatives are wholly derailed. A Mandatory
View must afford some room for the possibility that a would-be dissenting
state might divert or derail the possibility of law-formation; perhaps more
than one state is usually complicit in such resistance, but this merely
suggests that more independent, costly gestures are unnecessary.
Second, the hypothetical convention supposed that the obligations
involved are well-defined and restrictive, but that is frequently not the case.
Because CIL is unwritten and difficult to ascertain, states inevitably have
greater capacity to dispute whether there is CIL addressing a particular
activity and, if so, whether that CIL permits or prohibits its conduct. Even
when its status and content is uncontroversial, CIL typically leaves a
substantially greater margin for appreciation. Some states that might be
inclined to withdraw unilaterally—or persistently object—may instead
remain within the CIL process by contesting its status, its details, or its
application.32
Third, the Mandatory View allows yet another exception inherited
from the Default View: the possibility of incorporating consent into the rule
itself—employing withdrawal, that is, not as a means of exiting CIL, but
rather as a means of adapting CIL to the state’s preferences. For example,
under modern international law, a state has at least some capacity to temper
immunity rules by unilaterally declaring in advance the terms under which
another state or its diplomats engage the state;33 likewise a state may,
within limits, regulate the use of its water or other territory.34 The two
kinds of gestures are easy to confuse with one another—and may, indeed,
account for some of the apparent support for the Default View from
commentators35 and early judicial decisions.36 It should be apparent,

32. See, e.g., Bellinger & Haynes, supra note 23, at 9 (disagreeing with depiction of the United
States, France, and the United Kingdom as persistent objectors to a particular rule, and contending that
the opposition of those specially affected states meant “rather that the rule has not formed into a
customary rule at all”).
33. See, e.g., IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 324 (7th ed. 2008)
(“By license the agents of one state may enter the territory of another and there act in their official
capacity . . . [A]s a general principle this immunity is delimited by a right on the part of the receiving
state to use reasonable force to prevent or terminate activities which are in excess of the license
conferred . . . .”).
34. See, e.g., Right of Passage Over Indian Territory (Port. v. India), 1960 I.C.J. 6, 44-45 (April
12) (indicating that, at least in the instance of a bilateral custom, India retained the authority to regulate
and control passage rights enjoyed by Portugal).
35. Bradley and Gulati cite Bynkershoek, for example, whose treatise was devoted to the law of
ambassadors, “actually endors[ing] the Default View of CIL.” Bradley & Gulati, supra note 1, at 239
n.161. As they note, after asking whether a state can abolish ambassadorial immunities established by
the “common law of the nations,”] Bynkershoek answered: “I think that it can if it makes a public
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though, that they are materially different in their consequences. So far as
can be determined from the Default View, a state that withdraws
unilaterally from CIL is a stranger to it. 37 On the other hand, a state that
avails itself of exemptions within the rule is not, and does not thereby
disable the rule’s application to its relations with other states (or even,

announcement in regard to them, because these immunities owe such validity as they have not to any
law but only to a tacit presumption. One nation does not bind another, and not even a consensus of all
nations except one binds that one, isolated though it be, if it is independent and has decreed to use other
laws.” BYNKERSHOEK, supra note 15, at 106. It may be noteworthy, though, that Bynkershoek stated
that “these immunities” depend on only a tacit presumption, and that in the discussion immediately
following he stressed both the general point properly cited by Bradley and Gulati and the observation
that “it may truthfully be said of ambassadors’ privileges in general that they are of no avail if a formal
announcement to the contrary has been made,” id. at 107—something consistent with modern
suggestions regarding ambassadorial immunity.
Vattel’s clearest elaboration of unilateral withdrawal, too, took place in the context of ambassadorial
privileges and immunities. See Bradley & Gulati, supra note 1, at 216-17 (citing VATTEL, supra note 8,
Book IV, § 106. Establishing what he meant is difficult. On the one hand, he directly stated that he was
addressing not only the kind of obligations as “concerns ministers, but also in any other instance, in
general.”VATTEL, supra note 8, at § 106. Accordingly he was not confining himself to a feature of
ambassadorial law, such as a peculiar capacity to modify the application of that kind of rule, and
purported to be stating a general capacity for a state to declare that it would no longer observe a rule.
That said, the ensuing discussion makes it reasonably clear that he was contemplating a declaration by a
state that it would not observe customary law with respect to a particular state, rather than a declaration
that it was opting out of the norm altogether—though he hastens to add that it is more appropriate to
make a general declaration to reduce the prospect of offense.
More important, his discussion emphasizes the difference he perceived between indefeasible custom
and lesser norms—perhaps tracking his distinction between perfect and imperfect rights—insofar as he
says that advance notification permits withdrawal “provided that the privileges and honours which are
withheld be not essential to the nature of the embassy, and necessary to ensure its legitimate success”—
since those privileges and honors must be observed unless refusal is “founded on some very substantial
reason,” presumably articulated by the rule itself. Id. at § 106. This means, again, that only some
custom was subject to withdrawal, and that other custom—which might be more like what the
Mandatory View purportedly regards as mandatory—was subject to internal exemptions of the kind
discussed in the text. And again, Vattel’s discussion of the kinds of privileges and honors that were
subject to unilateral withdrawal made it appear as they might be more customary than legal in character,
and therefore would not even be recognized by the Mandatory View as CIL—such that no right of
withdrawal would be necessary.
36. Thus, in addition to Ware v. Hylton, discussed supra note 30, Bradley and Gulati cite the
famous case of Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, which chastised the United States for violating a tacit
commitment to respect France’s sovereign immunity “suddenly and without previous notice.” Bradley
& Gulati, supra note 1, at 220-21 (quoting 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 137, 147 (1812)). But the decision is
at least equally amenable to the reading that the United States had erred in not employing a capacity to
alter the application of the rule to France; the French ship, the Court reasoned, “supposed to enter a
foreign territory only under an express license, or in the confidence that the immunities belonging to his
independent sovereign station, though not expressly stipulated, are reserved by implication, and will be
extended to him,” Schooner Exch., 11 U.S. at 137, but it remained open to the United States within the
terms of that rule—not by withdrawing from it—to let France know otherwise.
37. Among the many logistical details never resolved by those suggesting a capacity for unilateral
withdrawal, including Bradley and Gulati, is whether a withdrawing state could opt back in—but it
seems like its withdrawal would, for such time as took effect, be comprehensive.
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necessarily, on other occasions in relation to the same state); moreover,
whether the rule is one that permits such exemption depends on the
substance of the rule in question, rather than being a feature of all CIL
(save for the nebulous category of perfect rights).
Finally, whose is the Mandatory View? A case may be made that
states have accepted the Mandatory View, though it is a matter of
compiling inferences. The fact that states rarely seem to avail themselves of
a persistent objector exception may, as Bradley and Gulati claim, indicate
that states do not take the Mandatory View seriously,38 but this rareness is
also consistent with the notion that states found it more productive to
quarrel over the content or application of international law as opposed to its
theoretical reach.39 The Statute of the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”),
on the other hand, appears fully consistent with the Mandatory View,40 and
certainly missed the opportunity to clarify that international custom was
subject to a litigating state’s advance negative; states do not seem to have
objected to the ICJ (or, before that, the Permanent Court International
Justice) decisions that generally apply CIL without regard to consent,41
though they would seemingly have every reason to protest when that CIL
was opposed to them. And if it is true that states have acquiesced in this
less forgiving version of CIL, it should at least inform the normative
analysis – at the very least, by explaining how one might, other than by a
universal treaty, accomplish the reversion to a Default View.
III. NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS
Bradley and Gulati do not make their normative assessment turn on
the absence of consent in the Mandatory View—no tears are wept for the
conscripted state.42 Their concern, rather, has to do with suboptimal

38. Bradley & Gulati, supra note 1, at 239-41.
39. Those negotiating the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties included articles that
sacrificed treaty provisions to peremptory norms in the teeth of objections that persistent objection, a
lesser concession than the Default View, should be maintained as a defense even for those norms.
40. Statute of the International Court of Justice art 38, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, 3 Bevans
1179 (“The Court . . . shall apply . . . international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as
law.”).
41. See, e.g.,North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G./Den. v. F.R.G./Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 38-39 (Feb.
20) (“[C]ustomary law rules . . . must have equal force for all members of the international community,
and cannot therefore be the subject of any right of unilateral exclusion exercisable at will by any one of
them in its own favour.”)]; see also Legality of Use of Force (Yug. v. U.S.), 1999 I.C.J. 916, 965 (June
2); Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (U.S. / Can.), 1984 I.C.J. 246,
292-93 (Oct. 12).
42. This may reflect their relatively glancing engagement with the longstanding debate over the
role of consent, see Bradley & Gulati, supra note 1, at 213-14, a debate that necessarily touches on
many of the same equities as their conception of a Mandatory View.
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lawmaking. Much of what they say is persuasive; the abstract nature of the
Default View, at this preliminary phase in its revival, means that it is
probably unproductive to debate some of the nuances. But the contrast to
their descriptive argument deserves highlighting. Despite being admirably
sensitive to the evolution of CIL principles, they pay less attention to the
development of alternative forms of lawmaking, which complicates the
analysis considerably.
Bradley and Gulati’s assessment of the “functional desirability of the
Mandatory View” (really, reasons why it is undesirable), taken by itself,
seems reasonable, if limited. Their argument that the difficulty in altering
CIL is out of sync with its murky and relaxed process of formation is
dubious to the extent it assumes that real CIL—that is, the kind
persuasively invoked against states by states, or by other prominent actors,
as opposed to that asserted by academics or interest groups—is easily
made.43 Were that assumption valid, in any case, it tempers the supposed
problem of holdouts: if CIL is formed easily or by an inscrutable process,
threats by would-be dissenters would lack force and credibility.44
Some of the more interesting claims, though, compare CIL to
withdrawal rights under treaties—which, Bradley and Gulati contend, have
not led to excessive withdrawals, and make it easier to adapt to change, but
may be impaired by overlapping CIL norms from which states cannot
withdraw.45 It seems difficult to conjecture about any two-level withdrawal
scenario—that is, the predicament of a state capable of withdrawing from a
treaty but unable to withdraw from a similar CIL rule. Such a state may
wish to avoid certain mechanisms unique to the treaty, such as dispute
resolution; may contemplate an eventual return to the treaty; or may simply
be unlikely to contemplate withdrawal from the class of treaties that
overlap with CIL (withdrawal might, for example, be more common with
respect to treaties grown out of sync with otherwise prevailing norms).
In any case, Bradley and Gulati may be criticized for celebrating the
diversity of treaty withdrawal schemes without taking equal account of
nuances in the CIL subject to the Mandatory View. Just as Vattel
contended, not all custom is alike. For CIL emerging in what might be

43. Bradley & Gulati, supra note 1, at 242-45; but cf. Robert Y. Jennings, The Identification of
International Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW: TEACHING AND PRACTICE 3, 5 (Bin Cheng ed., 1982)
(claiming that “most of what we perversely persist in calling customary international law is not only not
customary law,” but “it does not even faintly resemble a customary law”).
44. Bradley & Gulati, supra note 1, at 249 (describing the holdout problem as “the concern that a
disallowance of unilateral opt-out will cause nations to act opportunistically and demand concessions
before agreeing to any alterations of CIL (even efficient ones)”).
45. See id. at 245-46, 251-53.

SWAINE_FMT3.DOC

2010]

1/7/2011 4:03:34 PM

BESPOKE CUSTOM

219

called coordination games, concerns about affording room for withdrawal
are simply misplaced—states will have little incentive to change, and the
legal obligations will actually do little work.46 Where CIL is struggling to
secure genuine cooperation, on the other hand, exit may yet be
accomplished by other means—like temporizing about whether custom
exists, challenging its terms, or quarreling with its application.47
Distinguishing among different rules is entirely consistent with the final
section of the article, in which Bradley and Gulati properly plead for
disaggregating claims about the reliance, externality, and agency interests
supposedly served by the Mandatory View. Taking this approach seriously,
one might impose withdrawal rules for CIL that paralleled any withdrawal
rules employed for parallel treaty obligations—or, more crudely, handicap
or exclude as evidence of emerging CIL any multilateral treaty with a
withdrawal mechanism, perhaps subject to a period of examination as to
whether that mechanism is exploited.
The most fundamental point is that any normative assessment has to
credit the fact that CIL is only one choice for using law to address
international problems. As compared to conventional obligations, CIL does
seem limited in the design options it permits—albeit less so if some of its
substantive rules permit unilateral exemption, as has been argued. Still,
even under the Mandatory View depicted by Bradley and Gulati, states
retain the capacity to choose among treaties, custom, soft law, international
lawmaking institutions, and domestic alternatives when considering
whether and how to regulate. At first blush, it seems reasonable, then, for
the international system to have developed CIL with some distinctive
features, like the difficulty of withdrawal, in order to better serve situations
requiring such an instrument.
Of course, CIL’s distinctive terms may nonetheless be unreasonable if,
for example, it is invariably inefficient (perhaps for some of the reasons
Bradley and Gulati suggest), or because it is structurally flawed (perhaps
because it is foisted upon un-consenting states), or because its selection
cannot be optimized (perhaps because CIL is harnessed by different
players, perhaps not states at all, than those who select among the other
options for international lawmaking). But these are more extreme
arguments than the tentative and insightful normative account offered in
Withdrawing from International Custom. Unless the title proposes
comprehensively withdrawing from the system of international custom, as
46. See JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005).
Whether these norms should be termed CIL is another question, but Bradley and Gulati do not seem to
take a position on that.
47. See supra text accompanying note 35.
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opposed to the possibility for states of withdrawing from particular rules, it
remains to assess whether custom can do any distinctive good within a
complex regime—one that may or may not require distinctions among
types of custom, for purposes of withdrawal, but which certainly requires
considering every type of law before any particular form is revamped.

